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The Role of Access Capacity of Business Actors in the
“New Normal” Policy Congruence in Indonesia
Aryo Wasisto1, Lisnawati2
Center for Research Expertise Agency of the House of Representative of the Republic Indonesia, Indonesia1,2
aryo.wasisto@dpr.go.id1, lisnawati@dpr.go.id2
Abstract. In reducing the number of COVID-19 transmissions, the Government of Indonesia implemented a three-month social
restriction policy. The social restriction caused shocks in the economic sector. This article analyzes the motivational factors that
enable business people in Indonesia who are members of business organizations to use political party access and congruence to
accelerate the "new normal" policy. The access capacity is related to business people's ability to reach political parties, while
congruence can be seen from the level of their acceptance of policy outputs. This study develops a variable of access capacity
consisting of political party membership, company scales, and the type of business organization. Data was gathered through an
online survey using Google Forms to 147 business actors who are members of the national business group. By using logistic
regression analysis at the individual level, we find that the scale of the company owned by a businessperson significantly influences
her/his ability to access political party rather than passively following organizational policies. The company scale variable also
considerably affects the acceptance of the "new normal" policy. Businessman membership in political parties only affects access
capacity, but not policy congruence. In the context of COVID-19 in Indonesia, the increasing losses have an impact on accepting
the "new normal" policy. This finding indicates that in general: only large companies owners can directly lobby their political
representatives; pandemic, as a crisis situation, is an exception to produce congruent policies; capital is still the most powerful
modality in the policy; and COVID-19 has had a significant impact on business people's incongruence with the "new normal"
policy.
Keywords: new normal policy, policy congruence, business interest groups, COVID-19

INTRODUCTION
One characteristic of democratic countries is the
involvement of influential interest groups during the
policymaking process (Rönnbäck 2015; Sloof 2000;
Spiller 1990). Therefore, interest groups are considered successful when they are able to influence the
substance of the regulations. At the same time, they
get the least amount of loss during the implementation of the policy.
Realizing that the business interest group is the
strongest because it holds large capital (Paster, 2018),
this article analyzes business actors' motivational
factors in influencing the government and legislators to issue or improve policies according to their
preferences. Although individuals or companies can
design lobbying activities, usually business people
join associations representing the company's interests.
In general, their influence increases after building
coalitions and collecting shared resources (Massaro
2019).
This research's context is the business people's
response to Government Regulation Number 21 of
2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions
in the Context of Accelerating Handling of Corona
Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) or the "new normal"
policy. The regulation instructs companies to enforce
the requirements of a health protocol. The social
restriction policy during the COVID-19 period is the
response of every government in reducing transmission of the virus (Setiati and Azwar 2020). Three

reasons can explain business actors in Indonesia
accept or support the "new normal" policy. First,
this policy became a catalyst for reopening economic
activity as the strict social restriction policies pressured more business actors. Second, although the
"new normal" is not an optimal choice for business
actors, its function is urgent to initiate economic activity. Third, for some business actors, the "new normal"
can be an economic stimulus to support the government in reducing the impact of a pandemic such as
unemployment and a decrease in people's purchasing
power (Pramudita 2020).
However, some assumptions explain that business actors in Indonesia cannot fully accept the
"new normal" policy. First, several "new normal"
policy requirements increase the additional costs that
business actors charge. Second, business actors are
burdened with concerns that their employees may
open new clusters of infection.This article examines
whether business people in Indonesia fully accept this
regulation or not. This article also attempts to analyze
the relationship between business actors' modalities
in encouraging the "new normal" policy.
Companies are in a productivity crisis during
a time of social restriction in pandemic condition
(Ozili 2020). From this dilemma of interest that has
swept the world, several countries have delayed their
plans to accelerate their national economy (Asian
Development Bank 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic
is changing the way people interact, including political lobbying (Dodds et al. 2020). This research is
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necessary because businesses and governments face
asymmetrical interests: the importance of reducing
virus transmission and the importance of re-opening
economic activity. This article offers experimental
research with an individual focus on influencing
policy.
Low productivity due to the crisis impacts the sustainability of small companies, which has spread to
increase unemployment. The government recognizes
these problems as a dilemma. The end of the impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic is the cessation of business activities, especially for small companies, which
cannot survive to return their capital because social
restriction policies have limited economic transactions. For large investment-oriented companies, they
will rely on lobbying channels to produce good policies (Fairlie 2020).
This article tries to measure the level of relationship between business people and policymakers. First,
whether they use business association's channels or
directly influence the person involved in policymaking or political parties, it is well known that political
parties are the most influential institutions in democracy in Indonesia. The winning coalition political
party spreads its members in government, representatives, and other specialized positions (Budiatri 2018;
Noor 2016).
The choice of these two options may be less
enlightening because the alternative lobbying options
are varied and allow them to do both simultaneously.
However, for the initial step, these dependent variables can describe preferences that define the level of
strength of their influence. This experiment assumes
what Olson says that the highest interest groups are
always dominant (Olson 1965). This experiment also
assumes that individuals in interest groups act as
articulators in influencing decisions (Francisco 2010)
Second, this study proposes congruence in the psychological domain of the level of acceptance of the
policy. This concept is the extent to which the policies
produced by the government match their expectations.
It is assumed that the new typical policy that will
make citizens leave their homes is contrary to efforts
to reduce the transmission of COVID-19. On the other
hand, the business people group is the most influential because the interdependence between economic
growth is inevitable. Lindblom (1982) calls this relationship the interdependence of business people and
government as a structural dependence that imposes
boundaries and is often imperfect congruence.
Recent studies of business relationships and
policies have produced two significant responses:
confrontation and adaptation. The group of businesspeople may be considered the most powerful, but in
an economic crisis, they usually lose influence and
submit to the government's priority agenda. In this
situation, the business group is also more interested
in adopting adaptation methods (Paster 2018).
In this experiment, this research sought an individual level of analysis because the political economy
literature places exchanges on a personal level. This
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study's data is a limited survey of indigenous business
actors who are members of the Indonesian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). This organization has considerable experience in national-level
policy hearings.
This research provides variables, such as political party membership, types of interest groups, and
company scale. It also offers psychological variables,
such as concern about COVID-19 and the level of
company losses under social restriction policies.
Business people who are members of political parties
are allowed to take advantage of this access through
colleagues and shared ideology to generate policies.
Exchange information is the most difficult to explain
in interest group studies, although experts in this field
have cited numerous exchanges between senate members and lobbyists (de Figueiredo and Richter 2014).
Political party membership is a variable that
indicates the closest access modality in lobbying
(Yadav 2008). As with political party membership,
this article assumes that the type of interest group
describes access and the amount of capital (Dür and
Mateo González 2012). A businessman belonging to
a national level interest group has a higher chance
than those in the local sphere of gaining access to
political party representatives. A businessman who
has a larger company scale is predicted to have a
better access capacity than those who one smaller
one (Kılıç 2017). Because of the characteristics that
indicate modality, this article assumes these three
variables can motivate perfect congruence between
business people and "new normal" policies.
In a competitive democracy, business participation
in policymaking is reasonable (Berger, Hertog, and
Park 2002). Most studies of interest groups generally
emphasize the resistance of changing ecosystems in
a state's structure. The existence of interest groups
is often based on demands for uncertainty. As the
number of interest groups increases, it will even
increase heightened uncertainty (Richardson 2000).
Therefore, policymaking in the context of granting
the demands of interest groups often causes conflicts
between interest groups.
The access capacity is an essential part of the
modality of businesspeople in the policy area. The
ability to influence is largely determined by the
assumption that interest groups behave with personal
interests (Potters and Winden 1996). This point of
view in the context of the relationship of influence
in policy reminds that political parties are the only
means by which businesses can get closer to access.
Groll & Prummer (2016b) emphasize competitive
advantage and reward in the lobbying process as an
essential part of policy-making considerations even
though interest groups with the same power of influence can create bias in decision making. Therefore,
membership of political parties that support the government is one of the essential accesses. As Yadav
(2008) said, the party that the structure of the legislative body gives political parties extraordinary
control over the policy process. This situation leads
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the interest groups to lobby political parties and ignore
individual politicians unless they are essential party
gatekeepers.
Business groups as a specific subtype use their
political members or state actors to implement the policy-making process. Meanwhile, interest groups that
absorb more aspirations tend to be underestimated
than those closer to policymakers in lobbying competition. Actors outside the structure make it challenging
to influence policy. What distinguishes membership
of political parties and business organizations is that,
although they combine interests and preferences,
party membership can accelerate in a more closed
manner. For those within the structure, there is a hierarchy in the policy-making process rather than outside
organizations (Fraussen and Halpin 2018).
H1: Business actors who are members of political
parties provide an opportunity to utilize political parties in influencing "new normal" policies.
Some research on resource and policy lobbying
shows diverse strategies, such as who targets effective lobbying. In addition to the ideology that can be
translated into political party membership, spending
in the form of donations is also a part that influences success. De Figueiredo and Cameron (2014)
emphasize that business people with high levels of
resources target the pros and cons of unifying objectives. Therefore, even though business people are
in political party membership, the final determination is not ideological similarity, but resources that
can be easily shared. Lindblom (1993) also has
emphasized the striking difference between business
people and other interests in the process of influencing
policy. Regardless of the significant capital, which
may appear on the scale of the company, business
people do not only appear as special interests before
the government. They also appear to be an essential
function of government. The power of businesspeople almost creates actions that are almost akin
to public officials in several ways. They can create
demands they can count on the interests of all (Marsh
1983). In this context, the ITC survey shows that
small and medium-sized companies have the potential
to go bankrupt within three months in a pandemic
situation, especially facing social restriction policies
(International Trade Centre 2020). Meanwhile, the
impact of COVID-19 on large-scale companies is
related to reducing production volumes and updating
the shift model for their workers, which gradually
reduces company income every month (Zuniawan et
al. 2020). Since large companies have the advantage
of interfering with the government, it can be argued
that their preference for lockdowns is to seek policies
to reduce losses (Marsh 1983).
H2: The higher the scale of companies owned by
business people, giving them a great opportunity to
utilize political parties to influence "new normal"
policies.
Although Lindblom stated that groups of
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businesspeople have different strengths in access to
policies, Paster defies his theory a little by providing hints that business people do not always get the
policies they expect. At least business people face
challenges in two ways: confrontation and adaptation
(Paster 2018). He called it a challenge to democracy
in policy that causes congruence between parties not
to reach an equilibrium point because too many parties are fighting over interests in the policy, including
competition among businesses as well.
The literature on political congruence emphasizes
psychological similarities between representative
institutions and citizens' preferences that can be operationalized in a variety of ways (Huber and Powell
1994; Schakel and Hakhverdian 2018). In the context
of the "new normal" policy in Indonesia where business activities are re-operated, businesspeople face
the challenges of strict health protocols, especially
regarding the limitation of the number of workers,
the provision of personal protective equipment, and
the lack of attention in other aspects of the business.
The "new normal "policies may not be entirely
accepted by business people because, during the
process, the government is faced with critical social
conditions, namely health issues and broader citizen
demands. Although this policy arises from proposals
that might involve business people, the government
must also consider policies that generate public trust.
What is clear from this dilemma is that paramedics are
demanding strict policies regarding restrictions.
Although there is hope for businesses to resume
economic activity, it is crucial to map congruence
to get information about business dissatisfaction or
to get business configurations in the "new normal".
Therefore, we stipulate that congruence in the "new
normal" policy is that a businessperson fully accepts
(congruence) or does not fully accept (incongruence).
Some literature on the ability to influence policy
has clearly explained that interest groups that have
proper funding, lobbying and information capacity,
and transactions are critical to their success (Berger,
Hertog, and Park 2002). Beard (1913) has long
argued that elites who have business wealth can influence political decisions and suggest policies to be
designed. Therefore, the hypothesis, we emphasize
business configuration in the context of the COVID19 pandemic. First, we emphasize that large-scale
companies may result in higher bargaining power to
the Government or policymakers due to the long-term
favourable economic and tax interventions. Second,
there are losses due to restriction and panic policies
of citizens towards COVID-19, which allows businesses to accept the full policy because it does not
incur lobbying costs.
Several political economy studies have examined
the considerations of large-scale companies and their
ability to lobby the government to influence policy.
For example, Bauer et al. have found that large-scale
companies are more active in exchanging information
on foreign policy than small firms. Small companies
are more concerned with their own company. The
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competitive nature of large companies has prompted
their leaders to lobby the government to produce operational policies that are less constrained (Aizenberg
and Hanegraaff 2020). In a situation where the political institutions are more potent than the economy,
it will result in the domination of destructive policies to the company. In the opposite situation, where
economic actors control political institutions, it will
create high pressure in making policies that support
business. In the Indonesian context, this study tries to
relate the nature of large companies to emergencies,
for example, in the COVID-19 disaster. We assume
that large firms perceive a "new normal" policy as a
better option than none at all. In the COVID-19 situation, large-scale investment-oriented companies are
likely to be in a "new normal" policy. Therefore we
offer a hypothesis to explain the actual natural situation that large companies will accept the whole "new
normal" policy.
H3: Businessman with a large scale of companies,
allows to fully accept new normal policies.
Quoting Lindblom (1993), he argues that business
lobbies are successful in part because they can claim
they will suffer a financial loss and therefore possibly
lead to lost jobs and tax revenue. For them, lobbying
is an investment cost which can create a favourable situation financially (Olsen 2015). This study
assumes that the loss for the company and the lobbying effort is a package. This thinking is supported
by Aggarwal et al. (2012) findings that companies
make donations to politicians and lobbyists to promote the operational interests of their companies.
Since the "new normal" policy is a consequence of
an opportunity that business people desire to get out
of an unprecedented situation, we suggest measuring a psychological aspect to measure the impact of
COVID-19 on company losses. One of the expected
effects of company losses is the cessation of company
activities. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen small
companies shut down their activities. While large
companies are still able to operate, they are forced to
reduce their production intensity. The "new normal"
policy in the COVID-19 crisis is beneficial for companies to reduce the "lockdown" policy to avoid more
significant losses. Therefore, it is crucial to measure
the relationship between losses and congruence with
the "new normal" policy. This relationship provides
a projected effect on the partisanship of the government in crises.
H4: The businessperson has a slight loss that
makes it possible to fully accept the new normal
policy.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study employs survey 147 local Indonesian
business people using online features (Google Forms)
in early April to early July 2020. This time frame
illustrates the transition from a restriction policy
to conditional easing, which is essential to explain
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the respondents' psychology. Selected respondents
are business people who are still actively running
companies and are involved in various local and
national business organizations. The involvement of
employers in this study explains the close relationship
between the objectives of the "new normal" policy
and the interests of the state in reviving the declining economy due to restrictive policies to prevent
transmission of the COVID-19 virus.
This study explored access capacity by asking
whether businesspeople had access to political parties or policymaking representatives during times of
large-scale restrictions. The first answers are directed
for codes (1) = yes and (0) = no (they follow organizational policy). The question originates from the
context of the concept of efficacy adapted to "new
normal" and policymaking (Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, and
Ardévol-Abreu 2017). The question of access capacity can explain the cascading differences in access
capacity between memberships in organizations. Of
course, we suspect that those who take advantage of
direct access to political parties have a higher modality than those who do not. (Daugbjerg, Fraussen, and
Halpin 2018)
The level of congruence between "new normal"
policies and the expectations of business people is
measured by coding 1 for a businessman accepting the
"new normal" policy which is launched by the government and 0 for does not fully accept. We also measure
condense and simplify measurements by ignoring
stratification by assigning dichotomous scores: fully
accept and not fully accept. The advantage of using
this question is that answer (1) will give the most
congruent circumstances (Ferland 2020).
Table 1 shows the frequency of respondents using
less representative access to politics than those who
followed organizational decisions. These findings
illustrated that the political expertise and business
skills of its members are two different things (Gama,
Bandeira-de-Mello, and Spuldaro 2018). Political
access tends to be exclusive. Second, the concept
of internal conflict in interest in groups shows that
within a business group consists of various interests
so that influential people in internal try to narrow
down their interests to reduce the weakening of the
power of influence (Truijens and Hanegraaff 2020).
Third, in the context of the "new normal" policy, this
study assumes that congruence does not completely
occur because the policy also considers external
interests such as government targets to reduce virus
transmission.
This study identifies the types of interest groups,
where 0 is the local level, and 1 is the national level.
We also identified types of membership organizations
where 1 was businessmen belonging to a political
party and 0 was businessmen who was not a member
of a political party. To relate to a political motivation,
we propose an estimate of the level of loss experienced by business people during a period of social
restriction where 1 is no loss effect up to the 10 is the
most significant losses.
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This study expected that high losses on large companies where the owner is part of the political party
can influence businesses to accelerate "new normal"
policies through the role of political institutions
directly. The types of company scale adopt the classification in Law no. 20 of 2008 concerning Micro,
Small, and Medium Enterprises, in measurement is
1 is small with a total of 300 million - 2.5 billion
rupiah to 4 is a large international scale with annual
business results above 50 billion rupiahs This study
adds one independent variable to measure business
people's concerns about COVID-19. This measurement uses a Likert scale, 1 to 5. Score 1 = no concern
and 5 = high level of concern. This variable is useful
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic to describe
Table 1. Frequency of business actors in the "new normal"
policy.

economic interests and health interests.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Hypotheses are tested using logistic regression
analysis. Access capacity variables in influencing
policy (H1 and H2) are differentiated as dichotomous.
This decision is useful because it considers differences
in the capacity of business actors who have a dominant influence on the process of influencing policy.
This distinction is also helpful to avoid biased testing.
Testing the policy congruence variable, consisting
of H3 and H4, which is also dichotomous, is to get
a picture of congruence. This decision means that in
measuring the dichotomy, business people realize
the existence of "new normal" as a comprehensive
policy or not.
The link between access capacity and congruence is not a linear concept. Therefore, the dependent
variables are separated. Congruence concepts focus
on the psychological state after the policy is implemented, while access capacity is a set of modalities
for business people. Congruence can explain the final
results of the policymaking process. The relationship between the two do not show significance in the
Pearson correlation analysis.
Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for access capacity in influencing policy.
The column display consists of logit coefficients (B),
standard errors (S.E.), odds ratios (Exp. (B)) and
levels of significance displayed by star codes. The
odds value can be interpreted as follows: the odds are
Table 2. The congruence of businesspeople's policies to the
"new normal" policy
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smaller than one, explaining that the predictor reduces
the opportunity to influence policy use directly to
policymakers. Opportunities with more than one
increase opportunities to fully follow the organization in making policy.
The study presents two models that separate the
modality and psychology of a businessperson in the
policy arena. Of the modality variables, the variable
type of interest groups shows that business people
who are members of national-level business organizations have no the opportunity to utilize the access of
political parties or actors in government in making
policies. Second, the business membership variable
in political parties significantly explains the ability of
business people to use political institutions to influence policy. The third variable illustrates that the
larger the scale of the company is very significant in
encouraging business people to use political access
to influence individual policies.
The psychological model is related to the phenomenon of the COVID-19 pandemic. We divide it
into two controllers. First, the variable of concern
to COVID-19 in this study was not significant even
though the coefficient B showed negative results.
Second, the level of corporate losses is also not significant in explaining the determinants of a business
person utilizing a political party.
Table 4 shows the congruence between the results
of the "new normal" policy and the expectations of
business people. Of the three control variables in the
modality model, the company scale variable is the
only significant variable. These findings indicate that
the larger the company scale owned by business actors
motivates congruence to the "new normal" policy. The
second model, which emphasizes the psychological
aspect, shows that company losses affect congruence
with the "new normal" policy. In the context of this
research, it indicates that business people who get
high losses can motivate the level of congruence in
the "new normal" policy.
From the two logistic regression results above,
the company-scale variable shows the most substantial impact of significance among other variables in
explaining the modalities of policy access capacity and policy congruence. The large scale of the
company shows that the economic capital of a businessman is high as well as can affect his competitive
advantage and rewards in the lobbying process (Groll
and Prummer 2016a). The scale of the company can
also create a level of interference and bargaining
power between companies and the government, especially from the benefits of tax collection (Charles E.
Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). This dependence
might answer why the "new normal" policy was issued
amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This possibility is the
demand of the most influential business elite, whose
numbers are far less than other business people. The
thing that is most likely to be investigated further
is the sub-modality that is more specific about how
information exchange occurs. The larger the company
can formally benefit the government through taxes
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Table 3. Logistic regression binary analysis results for access
capacity.

or informal through political support. The personal
closeness between politicians and business people is
the best access to influence policymakers' decisions.
This significant result illustrates the relevance of the
relationship between the presence of "new normal"
as a new policy that reduces the lockdown function
and the presence of businessman association leaders.
The context of this research is very much tied
to COVID-19. The "New Normal" is an issue that
becomes valence when business people face social
restriction policies. The context of the COVID-19
pandemic is a disaster that does not directly damage
the means of production and marketing, but news
about deaths and high panic has made the tourism,
transportation, education sectors and market activities continue to stop for a moment. COVID-19 may
do psychological damage and cause panic due to the
implementation of the restriction policy, so the pressure for more than three months has reduced money
circulation. Including companies lay off their workers
for an indefinite period (Rossi et al. 2020).
Table 4. Logistic regression of businesspeople of new normal
policy congruence

The context of the "new normal" policy through
Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context
of Accelerating the Handling of Corona Virus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has created changes in
the conditions of economic policy lobbying. In this
very depressing situation, demands for economic
improvement accommodate some workers and business people.
This article aims to determine the access capacity
of business actors in using political parties to influence the “new normal” policy. As a continuation,
this article also investigates the policy congruence.
Most importantly, we found that interest group studies
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could be traced to individual survey investigations as
well as to understand their access capacities. Second,
we found that individuals have a higher capacity for
lobbying access than organizations. However, we also
found that although business interest groups have a
powerful influence on policy, not all of the lobby they
propose can be perfectly obtained.
This research claims that business people who are
members of political parties cannot merely access
them as successful lobbyists. They may belong to
national business organizations, but the multi-layered
internal party structure selects them to have significant capacity for influence. This finding is in line
with the concept of differences in access capacity
that the policy results not all groups (Fraussen and
Halpin 2018).
Hypothesis 1 is answered with certain conditions
related to the results of hypothesis 2. It is assumed
that there is a relationship between these findings and
the theory of business behaviour that they have two
dynamics: internal to the organization and external to
the organization. (Peltzman, Levine, and Noll 1989).
For example, outside of a business organization, a
member of a political party takes advantage of his
political party network in representative institutions or
parties in government, whereas when inside the organization he may have no more specific goals (Gama,
Bandeira-de-Mello, and Spuldaro 2018).
However, suppose we look at the strata of political
parties in Indonesia and consider the democracy of
policy-making. In that case, it is crucial to investigate whether business people who are members of
political parties who naturally occupy important positions both internally and in representative institutions
have a strategy of creating consensus. Meanwhile, the
study also assumed that business actors who are not
members of parties supporting the government, take
advantage of the shared mission raised by nationallevel business organizations instead of entering into
practical lobbying. When this study shows the variable types of interest groups that have no significant
effect, it argues that the key to successful lobbying is the use of political party channels rather than
their organizations. Directly, influential business
people have two dynamics in policymaking. First,
their behaviour is within the scope of their organization and political behaviour outside the organization.
(Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008). Second, political
party membership provides a higher chance than their
organization because after all, the government comes
from political parties as well.
The scale of the company in this study is a variable that can explain the interconnection between
the use of political parties and policy congruence.
This finding in line with Paster that business people
with large-scale firms appear to enjoy sufficient relevant resources to ensure political influence. This
relationship is what Paster calls an adaptation relationship, in which political parties and government
face incentives to meet business demands because
of the existing forces of structural and instrumental
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business forces (Paster 2018). The company's adaptation to the "new normal" policy seems to need to be
explored more deeply, whether the congruence created is the result they expected or is it only limited to
surrender to the COVID-19.
The emergence of a “new normal” policy is very
likely the result of a selective process to place various interests: health, economy, and increasing public
trust. This regulation was drafted by the Minister of
Health, who generally emphasizes the high standard
of health protocols. In this section, we need to pay
attention to the extent to which standard protocols can
reduce the productivity of a company.
The regression results show that a high rate of
loss can motivate congruence. These results do not
reflect how rational choice theory works. The only
explanation is Vogel's theory of the economic crisis
as a factor that can spontaneously reduce the influence
of businesspeople in policymaking (Vogel 1996). The
COVID-19 situation is different from a normal situation where the business is not hampered by factors
that are completely new and beyond expectations.
Business people with significant losses may view the
"new normal" policy as a decision that should be relatively accepted because the government has no other
alternative. Policies that are expected to be appropriate may give a legitimate burden to the government,
especially politicians who are in the government's
political parties (Vogel 1996).
The study did not produce a significant impact
between the level of concerns and the effort to influence policy (Mean = 4.15). The psychological problem
of fear of the COVID-19 virus and access to political
lobbying may not be linear. This result contrasts with
the fear of corporate loss, which has characterized
how business people must respond through adaptation
or confrontation. It needs a very detailed explanation
of whether the problems of businesspeople during
COVID-19 cause concern which eventually motivates
them to use political parties to create "new normal"
policies. "The obstacle to using this variable in this
study is that the worries of COVID-19 on the transmission might give contradictory results between
reactivating the economy and fear of corporate losses.
Access capacity describes the configuration of a
businessperson in the policy influencing process. The
modality model produces an R2 of 30%, where 70%
of the variables outside the study have the potential
to be discussed. The firm scale predictor is the only
one that significantly motivates business people to
take advantage of political parties and is congruent
to the "new normal" policy. As a complement, company management also needs to consider company
management variables such as accounts payable or
receivable, lobbying costs, and their closeness to
people in high-ranking party circles. The variables
in this model also illustrate that a businessman who
has large capital has opportunities in various accesses
in politics. The second model is an experiment that is
strongly tied to COVID-19 (R2 = 80%). Psychological
variables pose the challenge of placing the reality of
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concerning about COVID-19 with fear. Fear of loss
has the potential to encourage businesspeople to take
advantage of political parties.
This study contributes to explaining the relationship between modality and business behavior in a
crisis. More specifically, these findings suggest that
congruence and access capacity are relevant dependent variables and tend to answer policy questions in
confusing situations quickly. The crucial relationship
between business people and government cannot be
generalized that every business person is always congruent with economic policies that support economic
acceleration. Future research can broaden the crisis's
context by measuring the variable level of individual
concern more accurately. This study's variable types
of interest groups are not yet an appropriate measure
of congruence and access capacity. In the pandemic
COVID-19 context, the weakness of this variable is
that the organization leader determines the decisions
of some influential groups. This variable allows it to
be paired with the quality of democracy in the internal
organization. Future research should also consider
detailed measures of the welfare level of business
actors concerning their ability to lobby directly.
Future research is suggested to consider the weaknesses of this research, namely the lack of detailed
research on policy congruence. The COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis is a new arena for business people
and the government to organize a profitable relationship. This study adds to the repertoire of approaches
to understanding the power of influence of individual
business people in a democratic system.
CONCLUSION
This article analyzes two variables that are sequentially tied to the access capacity of businesspeople
in political parties and new normal policy congruence. The article concludes that a businessperson with
access to a political party will portray similarities to
the policies they expect. This finding may have confirmed that business groups are the most powerful, but
in crises, they lose their influence. The issuance of the
"new normal" policy amid the COVID-19 pandemic
explains the interdependence of business groups to
the government, but health interests have become the
concern of all citizens of the world who make business people try to adapt.
Company scale is a variable that affects two dependent variables. The larger the scale of the company,
predicting a businessman can use political party
access and is congruent with the "new normal" policy.
The scale of the company characterizes all matters
relating to the capacity and capital capabilities of
a businessman in continuing interaction with policymakers. We also assume that the internal layer of
policymakers is linear with the level of wealth of the
businessperson: the more productive the businessman
is, the more capable he is to be among influential
people. However, this variable needs to be extended
to a more specific nature, such as the allocation of
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funds spent on lobbying fees to reflect the suggestions
of the political economy discipline.
Anyone can play citizens' access to political parties in the formulation of policies in a democratic
system. However, the paradox is that only business
groups or business people who have linear modalities with one's position who can penetrate the layers
in a political party. Likewise, with congruence, only
company owners with a large scale are satisfied with
the "new normal" policy. This study also confirms
that capital is the most influential factor in bargaining
for policy change.
From the research results, we assume that the
“new normal” policy involving groups of businesspeople and health issues is an impartial bargaining
process. COVID-19 has heightened economic and
health uncertainty, while the two areas are in practice
at odds with each other. Besides, the public from all
walks of life is pressuring the government to solve it
simultaneously.
The concept of congruence in this study does not
consider the level of grading. This study entirely
places respondents on the accept and not accept
levels. There may be some among them who are
less accepting or quite accepting. The consideration
of using this measure to get a contrasting result is
because we previously hoped that the policies produced by influential business people were exactly
what they expected. This neglect might also be seen
as a weakness.
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